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Abstract. To counteract the lack of competition and innovation in the
financial services industry, the EU has issued the Second Payment Ser-
vices Directive (PSD2) encouraging account servicing payment service
providers to share data. The UK, similarly to other European countries,
has promoted a standard API for data sharing: the Open Banking Stan-
dard. We present a formal security analysis of its APIs, focusing on the
correctness of the Account and Transaction API protocol. The work re-
lies on a previously proposed methodology, which provided a practical
approach to protocol modelling and verification.
1 Introduction
The lack of competition in the financial services industry has been one of the
main factors that led the European Union to introduce the second version of
the Payment Services Directive (PSD2) [27], which aims to improve competition
by enabling and encouraging bank account holders to share, in a controlled and
secure way, their account data. This approach, along with economic opportuni-
ties, has clearly also important privacy and security implications that must be
carefully considered when building systems allowing data sharing on such scale.
To provide a standard API for the sharing of customer data across differ-
ent banks, the UK, similarly to other European countries, introduced the Open
Banking Standard [24]. The regulation encompasses several API specifications
suitable for different Third Party Providers (TPPs) who aim to service con-
sumers that consent to sharing their data. The adoption of a standardised in-
terface allows interoperability and simplifies the implementation of systems for
sharing data between banks and TPPs.
In such context, it is clear that formally validating complex software systems,
like the one covered in the present work, that can affected by design error and
implementation bugs, is of upmost importance to ensure that the system behaves
correctly with respect to the specification and a number of desirable properties.
Contribution In this paper, we present a formal security analysis of the Open
Banking Standard APIs, focusing on the verification of the correctness of the
Account and Transaction API protocol. The work relies on a previously proposed
methodology [8] which provided a practical approach to protocol modelling and
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
12
77
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
8 M
ar 
20
20
2 Abdulaziz Almehrej, Leo Freitas and Paolo Modesti
verification. The methodology utilises the Alice and Bob notation (AnB) [12] to
specify a formal model of the protocol that can be formally verified with the
OFMC model checker[3], which has been used to model and verify a significant
number of security protocols, for example a projects like AVANTSSAR [2].
We formalised and verified a number of security goals that are implicit in
the requirements. Although most goals were satisfied in our analysis, the lack
of rigourous definition of security properties in the standard can be a source
of ambiguity, potentially leading to different interpretation of the security re-
quirements in the implementation. Moreover, the standard seems to rely on a
number of current web technologies that could potentially become obsolete to
future technological and security needs.
To the best of our knowledge, our formal model represents the first attempt to
formally analyse Open Banking protocols. Recently, other authors [10] made an
evaluation of the integration of a web application with the Danish Nordea’s Open
Banking APIs considering the security threats of the underlining technology, in
light of OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security Risks list. However, they
did not analyse the security of Open Banking itself considering and assessing
security goals as we did. Therefore, we believe a formal analysis can be valuable
for stakeholders considering the adoption of a standard that can have a significant
and long impact on the efficiency and security of the financial sector.
2 Background
2.1 The Open Banking Standard Overview
The Payment Services Directive (PSD) is a European legislation, which aims to
improve payment services across the EU in terms of safety and innovation [6].
The first version of PSD was adopted in 2007 [26], but as the digitalisation of the
economy progressed, and new payment services appeared, it became outdated
and insufficient to ensure the provision of consumer protection and adequate
competition. Therefore, a revised version was adopted in November 2015 in an
attempt to:
– Ensure that all payment service providers have equal operating conditions;
– Expand the market for new means of payment;
– Ensure the security of consumers using the payment services [27].
To deliver the standard, the Open Banking Implementation Entity was es-
tablished in 2016 by the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) [17].
The Open Banking Working Group (OBWG) published a report on the Open
Banking Standard [24], in which they outlined two key outcomes:
– An open API for sharing data regarding the services offered by Account
Servicing Payment Service Providers (ASPSPs), e.g. banks;
– An open API for sharing the account data of Payment Service Users (PSUs)
provided by ASPSPs.
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Open Banking is not only concerned about the API endpoints (e.g. location
of resources accessible by third parties, such as developers, to build banking
and financial applications), but also about data and security standards. The
data standard provides data models to the API data format. The API standard
covers the API’s operational requirements. The security standard covers API
security requirements.
The Open Banking Standard has been released in phases with the latest in
September 2018 [20]. By October 2019, the standard has been adopted by 65
regulated ASPSPs with 123 TPPs providing services [19]. This illustrates the
significance Open Banking has on the financial services industry and thereby
the importance of verifying its standard’s correctness.
2.2 Account Information Service Provider (AISP)
The Account and Transaction API protocol (ATP) flow [18], which allows AISPs
access to the PSUs account data, is shown in Figure 1. An AISP is a regulated
entity allowed by ASPSPs to access a PSU’s account data if the PSU provides
their consent. This type of access is read-only as the AISPs are not expected
to directly affect the payment accounts they are allowed access to. An AISP
can then provide different services having the PSU’s account and transaction
data, including applications that provide a user-friendly view of the states of the
different payment accounts held by the PSU, budgeting advice, price comparisons
and product recommendations.
Fig. 1. The Account and Transaction API protocol high-level flow (adapted from [18])
The protocol is initiated with the PSU asking for information regarding their
payment account(s) from an AISP (Step 1). The AISP then attempts to create
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an account access consent with the corresponding ASPSP, based on the access
permissions agreed upon with the PSU. First, the AISP authenticates itself to
the ASPSP through a client credential grant, which is an approach for machine-
to-machine authentication. The ASPSP then provides the AISP with an access
token used to request the creation of the consent resource (Step 2). At this point,
the created account access consent has to be authorised to be used by the AISP
to access the PSU’s account data. This requires the PSUs to authenticate them-
selves to the ASPSP, followed by authorising the consent. During this phase,
the PSU has to select the payment accounts(s) for which the chosen permissions
should apply. The AISP then obtains an access token to the account data (Step
3). With this token, the AISP has to first retrieve the accessible accounts, in-
cluding their unique IDs, through the accounts endpoint. The IDs can later be
used to request the data of specific accounts (Step 4). To retrieve specific PSU
account data (e.g. balances, transactions, direct debits, beneficiaries, etc.) the
AISP will have to request the data via the appropriate link using the correct
endpoint and method from the ASPSP.
2.3 Methodology and Specification Language
The formal verification of Open Banking API presented in this work is based on
a protocol verification methodology proposed in [8]. The methodology utilises
the Alice and Bob notation (AnB) [12] to specify a formal model of the protocol
that can be formally verified through information flow (secrecy and authenticity)
goals. Such notation abstracts from implementation details, but allows formal
representation and analysis of the security-relevant characteristics of protocols.
An AnB specification comprises of several sections. The Types section de-
clares the different identifiers used in the protocol. This includes the agents,
constant and variable (random) numbers and transparent functions. Transpar-
ent functions are user-defined through their signature, thereby abstracting from
their implementation details (i.e. they are uninterpreted). The Knowledge sec-
tion describes the initial data each agent has before running the protocol. Fresh
values, The information flow is described in the Actions section, where details
about messages exchanged by agents are specified. Furthermore, the model can
be used to verify specific security properties, such as (weak and strong) authen-
tication and secrecy goals:
– A weakly authenticates B on M: agent A has evidence that the message
M has been endorsed by agent B with the intention to send it to A (i.e.
non-injective agreement [11]);
– A authenticates B on M: weak authentication plus evidence of the fresh-
ness of the message M (i.e injective agreement [11]);
– M secret between A, B: message M is kept secret among listed agents.
The formal model captures the protocol requirements [22]. While the Open
Banking API describes in details the information-flow, it lacks definitions of
security goals that the exchanges between agents are meant to convey. Therefore,
part of our work consisted in identifying suitable goals for the protocol model.
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For the verification, we used the Open-Source Fixed-Point Model-Checker
(OFMC) [13], a symbolic model-checker supporting the AnB notation. Moreover,
the AnBx Compiler and Code Generator [15] was used to pre-process the model
to benefit from a stricter type system and support the extension to AnB that
allows named expression abstractions (Definitions section).
3 Implementation
We define an AnBx model of the Account and Transaction API protocol
(ATP) [18] to analyse and verify its information flow accurately. We abstract
from, and do not directly specify dependant technologies like OAuth 2.0 [9],
which are defined in the Open Banking Security profile [21].
Confidential messages are exchanged over the internet. Therefore, the spec-
ification [23] mandates the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) between all
parties, as in the Financial API specification [25]. Verifying TLS is not our fo-
cus: we assume its security guarantees by partially simulating TLS with confiden-
tial and authentic communication using AnB bullet channels [14]. For example,
*->* represents a secure channel (authenticated and confidential) and can be
used as a suitable abstraction for TLS with mutual authentication [14].
We abstract from signing exchanged payloads too. Our objective is to model
the weakest version the specification allows for as it is likely to be the most
vulnerable. Consequently, as the additional layer of encryption is optional, we
do not cover it in the model, and may be part of future work. To help explain the
model, a sequence diagram containing AnBx action labels is given in Figure 2.
We describe each of the AnBx model sections next.
Roles and Responsibilities
There are four agents that participate in the protocol. The PSU initiates the
protocol aiming to grant an AISP limited access to their account data. The
AISP aims to obtain access to the PSU’s account data to provide the user with
a service. The ASPSP has two separate roles: the authorisation server (aspspA),
authenticating AISPs and PSUs to generate tokens that enable AISPs access to
endpoints; and the resource server (aspspR), maintaining resources like consents
and PSU account data.
By observing the responsibilities of each agent, the authorisation and resource
servers must be trusted parties: if any of them acts maliciously, the protocol
can be trivially broken. Trusted agents in AnB are represented by identifiers
beginning with a lower-case letter.
Agent PSU, AISP, aspspA, aspspR;
Initial Knowledge
The PSU and AISP know each other given that before protocol execution, the
PSU has been in contact with the AISP to exchange permissions and to inform
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Fig. 2. Model sequence diagram
of the ASPSP of contact intent. The AISP is assumed to identify the ASPSP’s
corresponding authorisation and resource servers. Thus, the AISP knows the
identities of both servers. The authorisation and resource servers are known to
each other and their identities are also known by the PSU.
Knowledge:
PSU : PSU, AISP, aspspA, aspspR, fPSUSecret(PSU);
AISP: AISP, PSU, aspspA, aspspR, fAISPSecret(AISP);
aspspA: aspspA, aspspR, fPSUSecret, fAISPSecret,
fAuthCode, fClientCredToken, fAuthCodeToken;
aspspR: aspspR, aspspA, fGetIntent, fCreateIntent,
fFetchAccounts,fAuthoriseIntent,fAccountsEndpoint;
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where PSU!=AISP,PSU!=aspspA,PSU!=aspspR
PSU/AISP. Authentication requires the PSU and AISP to share a secret with
the authorisation server. This secret is known a priori as represented by trans-
parent function calls fPSUSecret(PSU) and fAISPSecret(AISP), which
allows us to abstract from the secret agreement mechanism.
Authorisation and Resource Servers. The authorisation server performs
numerous state-changing operations over the protocol execution through trans-
parent functions: fClientCredToken generates a token acquired through
a client credential grant; fAuthCode generates an authorisation code; and
fAuthCodeToken generates a token acquired through the authorisation code.
The authorisation server is also aware of its PSU and AISP secrets in order
to authenticate them. The resource server performs state-changing operations
through transparent functions: fCreateIntent and fGetIntent to create
and retrieve a consent resource, respectively; fFetchAccounts retrieves a list
of all PSU accounts; fAuthoriseIntent updates consent authorisation; and
fAccountsEndpoint returns PSU account data.
Roles Restriction. To make our model more realistic, we impose restrictions
about the role performed by different agents. To declare which agent is not
allowed to act as another agent, we can use the where keyword at the end of
the Knowledge section. For example, the PSU cannot act as the AISP, which is
unrealistic as in the UK AISPs are regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA) [7]. We also excluded the possibility for the PSU to act as either of the
authorisation or resource servers, as these servers are considered trusted.
Actions
The protocol actions are described next alongside its exchanged messages as la-
belled in Figure 2. Actions are labelled according to each protocol step. There
are four steps: 1) Account Information Request ; 2) Account Access Consent
Setup; 3) Consent Authorisation; and 4) Data Request.
Actions:
# ----- Step 1: account information request -----
PSU *->* AISP: IntentAgreement #A1.1
# ----- Step 2: account access consent setup ----
AISP *->* aspspA: ClientTokenReq #A2.1
aspspA *->* AISP: ClientTokenRes #A2.2
AISP *->* aspspR: IntentReq #A2.3
aspspR *->* AISP: IntentRes #A2.4
# ----- Step 3: authorise consent -----
# ----- Step 3.1 -----
AISP *->* PSU: RedirectToASPSPCmd #A3.1.1
PSU *->* aspspA: InitAuthIntentReq #A3.1.2
# ----- Step 3.2 -----
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aspspA *->* aspspR: RetrieveIntentReq #A3.2.1
aspspR *->* aspspA: RetrieveIntentRes #A3.2.2
aspspA *->* PSU: RetrieveIntentRes #A3.2.3
PSU *->* aspspA: SelectedAccounts #A3.2.4
aspspA *->* aspspR: AuthoriseIntentReq #A3.2.5
aspspR *->* aspspA: AuthoriseIntentRes #A3.2.6
# ----- Step 3.3 -----
aspspA *->* PSU: RedirectToAISPCmd #A3.3.1
PSU *->* AISP: RedirectToAISPCmd #A3.3.2
AISP *->* aspspA: AuthTokenReq #A3.3.3
aspspA *->* AISP: AuthTokenRes #A3.3.4
# ----- Step 4: request data ------
AISP *->* aspspR: AccountsReq #A4.1
aspspR *->* AISP: AccountsRes #A4.2
Account Information Request. First, the PSU informs the AISP of them
wanting to share account information through an intent agreement (A1.1 ): it
is a numeric abstraction representing intent agreement between PSU and AISP.
This assumes that the PSU already has the permissions asked by the AISP.
The PSU then chooses which permissions to accept and adds further restrictions
on data access if required, thereby obtaining the intent agreement. This intent
agreement is not defined in the requirements and we assume this agreement could
differ between different protocol runs. There are two options: either defining it
as a random number (the one we chose as the most general option); or variable
dependent on parameters passed to a transparent function.
Account Access Consent Setup. To be able to create a consent resource,
the AISP informs the authorisation server that it requires an access token and
provides the necessary data for such a token (A2.1 ). The authorisation server
provides the AISP with the access token, referred here as client token, to request
the creation of a consent resource from the resource server (A2.2 ). This is done
after the authorisation server internally authenticates the AISP on their creden-
tials. After that, the AISP asks the resource server to create a consent resource
based on the agreement between the AISP and PSU (A2.3 ).
The requirements lack information regarding the communication between
the authorisation and resource servers. As a result, we assume these servers are
responsible for their roles only and that any limited and controlled access to each
other’s resources, if exists, does not have any side-effect on the protocol run. In
this case, when the authorisation server requires access to a consent or the PSU
accounts, it is assumed that it has to request such information from the resource
server. After creating a consent resource based on the request of the AISP, the
resource server provides the resource including its identifier to the AISP (A2.4 )
for later reference.
Consent authorisation. Authorisation is defined in 3 stages: 1) initiation
of consent authorisation; 2) review and authorise the consent; and 3) obtain an
access token to the PSU’s account data.
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After a consent resource has been created, the AISP instructs the PSU to
redirect to the authorisation server with the required data to request for consent
authorisation (A3.1.1 ). Following, the PSU redirects to the authorisation server
and requests consent authorisation (A3.1.2 ).
After internally authenticating the PSU, the authorisation server requests
from the resource server resources needed to be reviewed by the PSU before au-
thorising the consent (A3.2.1 ). The resource server provides the authorisation
server with the requested resources (A3.2.2 ). The authorisation server then for-
wards these resources to the PSU to review and authorise the consent (A3.2.3 ),
and inform the authorisation server of which of their accounts to associate with
the consent (A3.2.4 ). After the PSU authorises the consent, the authorisation
server forwards the authorisation process along with the required data to the
resource server (A3.2.5 ). This is because the authorisation server does not up-
date the consent resources as it is not its responsibility to maintain resources,
as previously assumed. Furthermore, sub-step 40 of the requirements sequence
diagram in [21], shows the authorisation server explicitly requesting the resource
server to update the consent resource. After authorising the consent resource,
the resource server updates the consent’s state and informs the authorisation
server of their success (A3.2.6 ).
When informed that the consent resource has been authorised, the authori-
sation server instructs the PSU to redirect to the AISP with the required data
to request for an access token (A3.3.1 ). The PSU redirects back to the AISP,
providing it with the required information to obtain an access token to the PSU
account data, referred to as an authorisation token (A3.3.2 ). The AISP then
requests such a token from the authorisation server (A3.3.3 ): part of the data
used for the request is only obtained after consent authorisation. Subsequently,
the authorisation server provides the AISP with the access token (A3.3.4 ). This
is done after the authorisation server internally authenticates the AISP on their
credentials.
Data request. As the AISP now has the access token, they request the resource
server to return the permitted PSU account data (A4.1 ). The resource server
then obtains and returns such data to the AISP (A4.2 ).
Messages Definitions
For each action, different messages are exchanged; we give examples of their
structure next, where full details is beyond the scope of this paper and can be
found in [1]. We abstract from data exchanges that do not affect the model’s
goals verification. For example, HTTP response codes and UUIDs are simplified.
Different from most AnB protocols, ATP messages do not have explicit cryp-
tographic expressions. That is because at numerous stages, exchanged authori-
sation codes/tokens are externally dependant (i.e. OAuth2.0, TLS, etc.). Thus,
what would usually be nonces exchanges through some shared crypto principles,
have to be abstracted through transparent functions in order to stick to defining
the ATP protocol itself, instead of its myriad dependant (internal) protocols.
10 Abdulaziz Almehrej, Leo Freitas and Paolo Modesti
For example, during account access-consent setup (A2.1), the
ClientTokenReq message is defined as AISP, fAISPSecret(AISP),
which entails the AISP’s identity followed by its secret to the authorisation
server, whom must know about it. A more involved exchange (AuthTokenReq)
occurs during consent authorisation (A3.3.3) when the AISP requests
from the authorisation server a different token for access to the PSU data
after various consent authorisation messages have been exchanged (A3.1.1–
3.3.2). This includes the original credentials used for the ClientTokenReq
message (i.e. the AISP’s shared secret with the authorisation server), as
well as the actual authorisation code generated after authorising the de-
clared/exchanged intent IntentRes (A2.4). The intent/consent is defined as
fCreateIntent(ClientToken, IntentAgreement): a transparent func-
tion that verifies the validity of the AISP’s client token and creates the account
access consent resource based on the intent agreement. The output, specifically
the consent’s ID, is then input into the authorisation code transparent function
(fAuthCode(IntentRes)), which calculates the intermediate authorisation
code [9, Sect. 1.3.1] used later by the AISP to request the authorisation token.
Fully expanded,the response message AuthTokenRes to the token request is
fAuthToken(fAuthCode(fCreateIntent(fClientCredToken(AISP),IntentAgreement)))
This layering of transparent functions entails various underlying state changes
enabling/preventing the correct execution of the protocol, hence characterising
whether the various aspects (e.g. agreements, consents, etc.) hold. Details of
these transparent functions specification and implementation is also beyond the
scope of this paper.
Security Goals
The primary objective of AnB models is to satisfy some protocols’ properties
of interest, i.e. security goals than can be verified with some verification tools.
There are no explicitly stated goals within the ATP requirements [24]. The goals
we identified (and verified) are based on our understanding of the protocol and on
its dependencies. For example, OAuth 2.0 security considerations [9, P.52-P.60],
protocol use cases in [24, P.20-P.23] and our expectations of the protocol.
We identified eight goals: four on message secrecy, and four on authentication.
fAISPSecret(AISP) secret between AISP,aspspA #G1
fPSUSecret(PSU) secret between PSU,aspspA #G2
ClientToken, AuthToken secret between AISP,aspspA,aspspR #G3
# FAILED initially + Fixed #A2.3
PSU authenticates aspspR on fGetIntent(Intent) #G4
aspspR authenticates PSU on SelectedAccounts #G5
PSU weakly authenticates AISP on ASPSPAuthPSUEndP,AISPEndP #G6
# FAILED + Fixed #A4.1 #A4.2
Accounts secret between AISP, aspspR #G7
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AISP authenticates aspspR on Accounts #G8
Two goals (G1 and G2) are obvious: the exchanged secrets/credentials be-
tween the AISP and PSU and the authorisation server remain secret whilst
requesting for a client token (Action 2.1 in the specification) and acquiring con-
sent authorisation (A3.1.2 and A3.3.3). That is because if the AISP credentials
are leaked (A2.1), many attacks would be possible (for instance [9, Sect. 10.2]
discusses client impersonation). Another secrecy goal (G3) states that various
exchanged tokens (A2.2–A2.3 and A3.3.4–A4.1) remain secret between the AISP
and the authorisation and resource servers. As tokens are AISP bound, a compro-
mised token cannot be directly used. However, [9, Sect. 10.3] requires tokens to
be confidential, to prevent attacks involving valid token injection [9, Sect. 10.12].
These goals clearly indicate the inherited potential vulnerabilities of the Account
and Transaction Protocol (ATP) dependencies. The final secrecy goal (G7) is
about the resource server message to the AISP (A4.2) and is obvious: account
information must remain secret.
The authentication goals relate to the PSU authenticating the consent re-
source to authorise (G4), the resource server authenticating the PSU’s selected
accounts information (G5) and the AISP authenticating the PSU’s account in-
formation from the resource server (G8). This last goal between the AISP and
the resource server is crucial in verifying the integrity of the account data sent
to the AISP by the resource server. In addition to direct data modification, it is
important to verify that old data cannot be replayed. For instance, in the case of
affordability check, if the PSU was an intruder and modified the data, they could
trick an AISP into providing a product they are not eligible for. This goal also
enforces fraud detection: if the transactional data can be modified by an intruder
to hide fraudulent activity. Given the redirections from the PSU to the autho-
risation server and AISP (A3.1.1 and A3.3.1–A3.3.2), we weakly authenticate
that those endpoints cannot be modified by an intruder to help avoid redirected
URI manipulation [9, Sect. 10.6] and phishing attacks [9, Sect. 10.11] (G6).
4 Results and Evaluation
We see this work from two perspectives: the actual AnB model and its verifi-
cation, and the experiment of having a MSc student (the first author) without
prior experience in formalism or security protocols tackle and find previously
unknown problems. Work was completed in 35 person-days involving: learning
AnB and its tools (4;12%), creating the AnB model versions (14;40%), veri-
fying the model goals (12;34%) and documenting the process (5;14%). When
needed, the student had access to experts in the field, supervising his work. The
learning time shows the low barrier to entry in using AnB. This is particularly
the case given the significant dependencies the Account and Transaction API
requirements have [9,25,21].
A significant portion of time was spent creating the model, which is unsur-
prising; and given the acquired experience, we have empirical evidence which
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suggests the creation time reduces as more models are tackled by the same per-
son. Verification time is similar: it takes a significant amount to time to learn
the tool insights; yet this can be leveraged across multiple examples. Crucially,
this is an insignificant amount of time to discover important unknown issues
and verify implicitly assumed/desired properties of the protocol, compared to
the effort required to develop a concrete implementation say in Python [16]. It
should be noted that the AnBx compiler [15] also enables Java code generation,
which can be deployed to further experiment with the protocol. Thus, we argue
our methodology [8] can be an effective approach to help design and develop
reliable safety/security-critical protocols.
Model Development. The Open Banking ATP is complex and with mul-
tiple dependencies. The AnB model aims to provide an abstract and accurate
view of its essential aspects and to verify key properties. The initial AnB model
was overly detailed with unnecessary data exchanges. To reach the right level
of abstraction, we then decided to first determine the protocol goals prior to
abstracting. Even after such endevour, verification was unwieldy: it ran for over
two days without response. As is common within model checking problems, state
explosion must be tackled beyond abstracting details, abstract on irrelevant data.
Restricting the role of the PSU, where it had to be different from the AISP
and servers, considerably reduced the state space. This led to termination with
goal verification to be reduced to about seven hours. This enabled us to identify
further steps to abstract related to data, which reduced the verification time to
about six minutes. A final abstraction related to the various TLS-related steps,
which we encoded using AnB bullet channels used to encrypt messages based on
the identities of the sender and recipient. Their internal efficiency within OFMC
led the final version to verify within eight seconds. This exponential efficiency
(up to 5 orders of magnitude) increase is not uncommon in model checking
problems, so long the right abstractions are taken alongside expert knowledge
of the tool’s implementation.
Model Correctness. We used the OFMC model checker [3] to verify the
eight goals described above. At first, three goals (G4,G7,G8 ) about PSU intent
authentication and account information secrecy and integrity failed. This led
us to check these goals independently in order to study their reason for failure
quickly. The witness for the PSU authentication failure (G4 ) relates to the re-
source server authenticating with an unknown agent rather than the PSU. This
was fixed by having the resource server being aware of the PSU’s identity early
on when setting up the access consent with the AISP (A3.2). Thus, this failure
identifies a previously undocumented vulnerability, which our modification fixes.
The account information goals fail due to a limitation of bullet channels: they
do not protect against replay attacks, hence their use here allowed breaking both
secrecy (G7 ) and integrity (G8 ). The intruder could respond to the AISP’s re-
quest for account data by replaying a previous message. This breaks integrity
as the response received by the AISP, and perceived to be the account data,
has been modified. As the data replayed is known to the intruder, it also breaks
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secrecy of the account data. However, the TLS protocol does protect against
message replay [5, P.93-P.94]. To deal with this limitation and ensure that fresh-
ness would resolve the issue, we modified the model to include a nonce generated
and sent by the AISP when requesting for the PSU account data and is expected
to be part of the response.
These modifications enable checking all goals for one session. Multiple ses-
sions verification is important as there could be attacks relying on multiple
concurrent protocol runs. Due to increased state space and limited hardware, we
were unable to fully verify the model for two parallel sessions due to hardware
and software limitations. As customary in such situation (e.g. [4] for iKP and
SET), we were able to obtain partial results by increasing the search space up
to the available resource limits (search space depth: 15 plies, 14.5GB RAM, 50
hours to run) without being able to reach any attack state.
5 Conclusion
This paper details the AnB model of the novel Open Banking Account and
Transaction protocol. It is a security-critical protocol, which is being enforced
on the largest banks in Europe. Given the protocol’s significance and expected
wider use, verifying its correctness is crucial. We relied on a verification method-
ology [8] using various languages and tools. Our findings were disseminated as
part of a presentation on PSD2 at a UK Finance event, with representatives from
Visa and MasterCard, as well as several banks. Some of the identified goals were
known, others not. The audience was particularly keen on the time/cost analy-
sis. As part of the work, we considered also the socio-technical aspects described
in Section 4 indicating that the methodology provides a practical development
path for producing dependable formal protocols. Even though the verification
pushed the OFMC model checker to its limits, the time/cost involved is negligi-
ble compared to the alternative of direct implementation [16]. Our future work
will focus on the modelling of the protocol’s state and transparent functions
specification in VDM-SL: this is aimed at discovering underlying vulnerabilities
related to the myriad of dependant technologies (e.g. OAuth2, TLS, etc.).
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Appendix
A Model
Protocol: ob_aisp_protocol AnB
Types:
# Four parties -- ASPSP = authorisation server + resource server
Agent PSU, AISP, aspspAuth, aspspRes;
# PSU Redirection URIs
Number ASPSPAuthPSUEndpoint, AISPEndpoint;
# Abstract away from specific intent details agreed on between PSU and AISP
Number IntentAgreement;
# PSU account selection for consent
Number SelectedAccounts;
# constants
Number empty;
# *** MODIFICATION: defined a nonce ***
# in order to fix G7 and G8
Number AccountsNonce;
# ---- ASPSP Authorisation Server Functionality ---- #
# Returns agreed on secret between AISP and authorisation server
# Params: AISP ID -- Output: the secret
Function [Agent -> Number] fcnAISPSecret;
# Returns agreed on secret between PSU and authorisation server
# Params: PSU ID -- Output: the secret
Function [Agent -> Number] fcnPSUSecret;
# Generate a base level token for accessing consent creation API
# Params: AISP ID -- Output: client token
Function [Agent -> Number] fcnClientCredToken;
# Generate authorisation code exchangeable for an access token
# Params: consent ID -- Output: authorisation code
Function [Number -> Number] fcnAuthCode;
# Create an access token for account data access
# Params: authorisation code -- Output: authorisation code token
Function [Number -> Number] fcnAuthCodeToken;
# ---- ASPSP Resource Server Functionality ---- #
# Create and return a consent resource
# Params: client token, intent payload -- Output: consent ID
Function [Number, Number -> Number] fcnCreateIntent;
# Retrieve the consent with the given identifier
# Params: consent ID -- Output: consent resource
Function [Number -> Number] fcnGetIntent;
# Return complete list of PSU accounts
# Params: PSU ID -- Output: list of all PSU accounts with ASPSP
Function [Agent -> Number] fcnFetchAccounts;
# Change consent’s status to authorised
# Params: PSU ID, consent ID, selected PSU accounts -- Output: authorisation
result
Function [Agent, Number, Number -> Number] fcnAuthoriseIntent;
# Fetch PSU account(s) (request by AISP)
# Params: authorisation code token, account identifier -- Output: account info
.
# Note: if account identifier = empty then it is a bulk call
Function [Number, Number -> Number] fcnAccountsEndpoint
Definitions:
# AISP credentials to be authenticated by ASPSP
AISPCredentials : AISP, fcnAISPSecret(AISP);
# **RFC6749 4.4. Client Credentials Grant
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# For asking for a client token
ClientTokenReq : AISPCredentials;
# For returning a client token
# Token generated through the Client Credential Grant (refer to it as client
token)
ClientToken : fcnClientCredToken(AISP);
ClientTokenRes : ClientToken;
# **OB Account Access Consents v3.1.1
# For asking for the creation of an intent
# Assume that the risk data is included with the intent agreement
IntentReq : ClientToken, IntentAgreement;
# For returning for the created intent
# Treat the intent as an intent ID or a complete intent object (abstraction)
Intent : fcnCreateIntent(ClientToken, IntentAgreement);
IntentRes : Intent;
# ------- Consent Authorisation (Authorisation Code Grant) -------
# **RFC6749 4.1. Authorization Code Grant + OB Account and Transaction API
Sequence Diagram (Step 3)
# Redirection command given by AISP to PSU to redirect to ASPSP and authorise
consent
RedirectToASPSPCmd: ASPSPAuthPSUEndpoint, AISPEndpoint, Intent;
# PSU Credentials to be authenticated by ASPSP
PSUCredentials : PSU, fcnPSUSecret(PSU);
# Payload sent by PSU to ASPSP authorisation server to authenticate themselves
and initiate consent authorisation
InitAuthIntentReq : RedirectToASPSPCmd, PSUCredentials;
# For PSU consent review and account select
RetrieveIntentReq : Intent, PSU;
RetrieveIntentRes : fcnGetIntent(Intent), fcnFetchAccounts(PSU);
# For updating consent resource’s state
AuthoriseIntentReq: PSU, Intent, SelectedAccounts;
AuthoriseIntentRes: fcnAuthoriseIntent(PSU, Intent, SelectedAccounts);
# For generating authorisation code
AuthorisationCode : fcnAuthCode(Intent);
# Redirection command given by ASPSP to PSU to redirect to AISP
RedirectToAISPCmd : AISPEndpoint, AuthorisationCode;
# ----------------------------------------------------------------
# **RFC6749 4.1. Authorization Code Grant
# For asking for an authorisation token
AuthTokenReq : AISPCredentials, AuthorisationCode;
# For returning an authorisation token
AuthToken : fcnAuthCodeToken(AuthorisationCode);
AuthTokenRes : AuthToken;
# **OB Accounts v3.1.1
# For asking for the PSU accounts list
AccountsReq : AuthToken;
# For returning the PSU accounts list
Accounts : fcnAccountsEndpoint(AuthToken, empty);
AccountsRes : Accounts
Knowledge:
PSU : PSU, AISP, aspspAuth, aspspRes, fcnPSUSecret(PSU);
AISP : AISP, PSU, aspspAuth, aspspRes, fcnAISPSecret(AISP),empty;
aspspAuth: aspspAuth, aspspRes, fcnPSUSecret, fcnAISPSecret,
fcnClientCredToken, fcnAuthCode, fcnAuthCodeToken;
aspspRes : aspspRes, aspspAuth, fcnCreateIntent, fcnGetIntent,
fcnFetchAccounts, fcnAuthoriseIntent,
fcnAccountsEndpoint,empty
# Impose condition that a PSU cannot also be the AISP or any of the ASPSP’s
servers
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# Impose condition that AISP cannot be ASPSP due to unrealistic conditions if
allowed in AnB
where PSU!=AISP,PSU!=aspspAuth,PSU!=aspspRes,AISP!=aspspAuth,AISP!=aspspRes
Actions:
# ----- Step 1: request account information -----
PSU *->* AISP : IntentAgreement #A1.1
# ----- Step 2: setup account access consent ----
AISP *->* aspspAuth : ClientTokenReq #A2.1
aspspAuth *->* AISP : ClientTokenRes #A2.2
# Failing goal G4
# AISP *->* aspspRes : IntentReq,PSU,AISP #A2.3
# Fixes G4
AISP *->* aspspRes : IntentReq,PSU,AISP #A2.3
aspspRes *->* AISP : IntentRes #A2.4
# ----- Step 3: authorise consent -----
# (using authorisation code grant)
# ----- Step 3.1 -----
AISP *->* PSU : RedirectToASPSPCmd #A3.1.1
PSU *->* aspspAuth : InitAuthIntentReq #A3.1.2
# ----- Step 3.2 -----
aspspAuth *->* aspspRes: RetrieveIntentReq #A3.2.1
aspspRes *->* aspspAuth: RetrieveIntentRes #A3.2.2
aspspAuth *->* PSU : RetrieveIntentRes #A3.2.3
PSU *->* aspspAuth : SelectedAccounts #A3.2.4
aspspAuth *->* aspspRes: AuthoriseIntentReq #A3.2.5
aspspRes *->* aspspAuth: AuthoriseIntentRes #A3.2.6
# ----- Step 3.3 -----
aspspAuth *->* PSU : RedirectToAISPCmd #A3.3.1
PSU *->* AISP : RedirectToAISPCmd #A3.3.2
AISP *->* aspspAuth : AuthTokenReq #A3.3.3
aspspAuth *->* AISP : AuthTokenRes #A3.3.4
# ----- Step 4: request data ------
# Failing goals G7 and G8
# AISP *->* aspspRes : AccountsReq #A4.1
# aspspRes *->* AISP : AccountsRes #A4.2
# fixes G7 and G8
AISP *->* aspspRes : AccountsReq,AccountsNonce #A4.1
aspspRes *->* AISP : AccountsRes,AccountsNonce #A4.2
Goals:
fcnAISPSecret(AISP) secret between AISP, aspspAuth #G1
fcnPSUSecret(PSU) secret between PSU, aspspAuth #G2
ClientToken, AuthToken secret between AISP, aspspAuth, aspspRes #G3
# FAILED initially
# Fixed #A2.3
PSU authenticates aspspRes on fcnGetIntent(Intent) #G4
aspspRes authenticates PSU on SelectedAccounts #G5
PSU weakly authenticates AISP on ASPSPAuthPSUEndpoint, AISPEndpoint #G6
# FAILED
# Fixed #A4.1 #A4.2
Accounts secret between AISP, aspspRes #G7
# FAILED
# Fixed #A4.1 #A4.2
AISP authenticates aspspRes on Accounts #G8
